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Abstract
We use a multi-task principal-agent model with moral hazard to study
environmental regulation of a private agent by an EPA that can also
allocate its budget to an alternative project with environmental beneﬁts.
In a ﬁrst possible optimum, the EPA imposes a ﬂat ﬁne that exhausts
the agent’s participation constraint. In the second, the EPA provides
the harshest possible punishment for a “poor” observed environmental
performance and the highest possible reward for a “good” observed en-
vironmental performance. Increases in the available budget and in the
maximally allowed penalty have then an ambiguous eﬀect on total envi-
ronmental quality.
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11 Introduction
When policy-makers started introducing the ﬁrst environmental taxes, economists
discovered that these taxes had very little connections with the textbook ideal.
According to Bressers and Huitema [2], for instance:
(...) most of the levies actually introduced are not intended to
achieve a change in behavior, but to generate revenues (...) there is
seldom a clear relation between the amount of the sum to be paid
and the targeted behavior. Waste tariﬀs for household, for instance,
usually do not vary in proportion to the amount of waste produced.
Recent OECD data [11] conﬁrm that environmental taxes are more often
than not earmarked for environmental projects undertaken by the public au-
thorities.
In this paper, we provide a new possible rationale for this observation. At
the same time, we aim to provide a new step towards a theory of environmental
regulation under asymmetric information. In particular, we focus on the case
when the environmental regulator has to distribute his ﬁnancial resources ac-
cording to a speciﬁc budget and is restricted to make his policy contingent on the
environmental quality performance only of the parties subject to its regulation.
This latter objective needs some words of explanation.
In the theory of environmental regulation, it is a standard approach to con-
sider the government as a unique, benevolent agency in charge of many diﬀerent
and possibly conﬂicting regulatory dimensions (environmental costs, producer
and consumer surplus, enforcement costs, etc). However, in real life, division of
labor is an important feature of government agencies. Rationales for this divi-
sion of labor have been provided by, for instance, Martimort [8] and Laﬀont and
Martimort [7]. According to these authors, limiting the scope of a regulator’s
authority may be an optimal response to possible non-benevolence or capture.
Martimort [9] has also argued that the separation of power between regulators
helps a government to commit.
In this paper, we consider the problem of eﬀort allocation by a (public or
private) agent who divides its eﬀort between two tasks: on the one hand, en-
vironmental protection, and on the other hand a task that brings only private
beneﬁts. The Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, has a ﬁxed budget, that
can be used either in order to provide incentives to the agent or for some alter-
native project undertaken directly by the EPA. Following the literature we just
mentionned, we assume that the EPA is only allowed to provide incentives for
environmental protecion, without taking other considerations into account.
A concrete example we might think of is the water policy in the Belgian
region of Flanders. On the one hand, the Flemish government subsidizes the
construction of collective sewerage and abatement installations. On the other
hand, both households and ﬁrms are subject to water levies that are earmarked
for environmental protection.4 We shall show in the concluding remarks that
4The actual scheme is rather complicated, but this is essentially the philosophy behind it
- details are available from the authors on request.
2our results are coherent with this real life example.
The central result of this paper is that, if the EPA cannot observe the agent’s
allocation of eﬀort amongst the two tasks, then there are two possible equilibria.
In the ﬁrst possible equilibrium, the agent implements the unregulated eﬀort
levels. The EPA imposes the highest lump sum tax that satisﬁes the agent’s
participation constraint, and uses the tax receipts to ﬁnance its own project.
In the second possible equilibrium, the EPA imposes the harshest punishment
for any observed environmental performance whose likelihood of observation is
decreasing in environmental eﬀort, and transfers its entire budget for any ob-
served environmental performance whose likelihood of observation is increasing
in environmental eﬀort. This induces the agent to undertake the highest imple-
mentable level of environmental eﬀort, and the lowest possible level of eﬀort on
its core tasks. Furthermore, we show that, under plausible assumptions about
the cost of eﬀort, the EPA bribes the agent to impose zero eﬀort in its core task
if the absolute value of the allowed side payment is high enough.
Technically, we will develop a multi-task principal-agent problem with moral
hazard.
This model is closely linked to Holmstr¨ om’s and Milgrom’s analysis of in-
centive contracts and job design in multitask settings [4].5
One of the important topics in Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom is “how a ﬁrm might
optimally set policies limiting personal business activities on company time”.
Formally speaking, in our model, the agent’s core task is such an “outside”
activity from the EPA’s point of view: it brings no beneﬁts to the EPA, it aﬀects
the marginal cost of environmental protection, and it brings private beneﬁts to
the agent. In Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom [4], the principal has the authority to
exclude some or all outside activities. In Section 4 of their paper, it is shown
that, depending on the parameters, it might be optimal to allow some outside
activities but to exclude others. More speciﬁcally, they show (Proposition 3)
that the agent’s freedom to pursue private goals increases when his marginal
reward in the main job (this is, the job that brings beneﬁts to the principal)
increases.
How does this compare with our analysis?
In the context of our model, the approach proposed by Holmstr¨ om and
Milgrom wouldn’t make sense: an EPA deﬁnitely does not have the power to
prohibit the core task of an agent. However, as we just mentioned, in our
model, in one possible optimum, the EPA will provide incentives to limit these
productive activities as much as possible. On the other hand, we also see that
the EPA may choose not to aﬀect the productive activity at all.
5Milgrom and Roberts [10] provides an even earlier analysis of multitasking. However, their
model considers a very speciﬁc problem where employees “can devote time and attention either
to increasing output in their current assignments or to establishing their qualiﬁcations” for
a key job within the organization that needs to be ﬁlled. The problem for the organization
is then that “it cannot determine whether observed diﬀerences in qualiﬁcations reﬂect actual
diﬀerences in the employees’ expected productivities in the key job or are merely the result
of one of them having devoted too much time to building his credentials”. This is deﬁnitely
not the problem we are considering here.
3Thus, although the EPA does certainly not have the same discretionary
power as a ﬁrm’s owners, the eﬀects of its incentive scheme can be close to what
a ﬁrm’s owner might impose.
2 Presentation of the model
We will now move on to describe our formal model.
Technically, we follow closely the setting chosen by Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [13],
and we refer to that paper for more detailed arguments - it can be veriﬁed that
our conclusions do not depend on these technical details.
Formally, we consider the problem of eﬀort allocation by a (public or private)
agent. This agent (which, in the remainder of the analysis, will be considered as
a monolithic bloc) must divide its eﬀort between two tasks, A and B. An eﬀort
level a on A results in an output αi where i = 1,...,I and αi is increasing in its
index. The likelihood of observing output αi when the agent delivers an eﬀort
a is written pi(a). The agent’s eﬀort on B is noted b and results in an output
level βj where j = 1,2,...,J and βj increases in j. The likelihood of observing
output βj when the agent delivers an eﬀort b is written qj(b).
We shall assume that the agent is only concerned with performance on task
B. In a private ﬁrm, an obvious candidate for task B would be corporate proﬁts.
If the agent is a public organization, the logic of the division of labor inside
government we have described in the introduction implies that task B is the
unique core task of the agent.
However, there exists an outside principal, the Environmental Protection
Agency, EPA, who only cares about performance on task A, which we interpret
as environmental performance. We shall assume here that the EPA is the only
regulatory institution that is aﬀected by the agent’s activities.
The functions pi(a) and qj(b) are assumed to be strictly positive and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable in (a,b); they are also supposed to be independently
distributed. Of course,
PI
i=1 pi(a) = 1 and
PJ
j=1 qj(b) = 1.
Thus,
P
j qj(b)βj is expected performance on the agent’s core task, and P
i pi(a)αi is expected environmental performance.
For reasons that will become clear later in the paper, we assume that the
conventional monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds strictly:






qj(b) are increasing in i and j.
The standard interpretation of this assumption is that the higher αi (βj),
the higher the likelihood that the agent has chosen a high value of a (resp. b).
It can be shown that strict MLRP implies strict ﬁrst-order stochastic domi-













j=j1 qj1(b)) is the cumulative distribution function of αi (resp. βj) condition-
ally on eﬀort level a (resp. b). In words, ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance means
4that the cumulative distribution function of α and β moves to the right when a
or b increase.
Finally, strict MLRP implies that there exists an i∗ ∈]0,I[ such that for
all i < i∗,
dpi(a)
da < 0 and for all i > i∗,
dpi(a)
da > 0 (and where
dpi∗(a)
da ≥ 0).
Similarly, there exists a j∗ ∈]0,J[ such that for all j < j∗,
dqj(b)
db < 0 and for all
j > j∗,
dqj(b)
db > 0 (and where
dqj∗(b)
db ≥ 0).
c(a,b) is the agent’s cost of eﬀort. It is assumed to be positive, strictly



















∂a∂b > 0 for all a and b. Thus, a higher eﬀort on one task raises the
marginal cost of eﬀort on the other task. Finally, we assume that the agent has
no intrinsic motivation at all for environmental protection :
∂c(.)
∂a > 0 for all a
and b - we introduce no prior restrictions on the sign of
∂c(.)
∂b .
We want now to investigate how the EPA can aﬀect the agent’s incentives
to allocate his eﬀorts between the two tasks.
We assume that the EPA has a ﬁxed budget Y . This budget can be used
either in order to provide a side payment yi,j (that depends on observed perfor-
mance) or for some alternative project. We assume that this alternative project
is under perfect control by the EPA6 and brings therefore certain environmental
beneﬁts EB(.). These beneﬁts are assumed to be strictly increasing and con-
cave in the sums allocated to this alternative project. Thus: (EB(.))0 > 0 and
(EB(.))00 < 0. Finally, if no money is allocated to the alternative project, then
it brings no environmental beneﬁt: EB(0) = 0.
We impose no prior restrictions on the sign of yi,j. Thus, if yi,j < 0, then
the EPA imposes a penalty and she has now more money to spend on her
alternative project.7 If yi,j > 0, then the EPA provides a side payment and
there is less money available for the alternative project. However, in both cases,
the assumptions with respect to the ﬁrst and the second derivative are plausible.
Finally, we suppose that there are institutional constraints such that −xmin is
the upper limit to the ﬁnes that the EPA can impose on the regulated agent (or
such that xmin is the minimal transfer).
The structure of the paper is as follows.
First, we analyze the agent’s payoﬀ function and optimality conditions for
arbitrary contingent ﬁnancial transfers (Section 3).
Next, we consider the ﬁrst-best solution with observable eﬀort (Section 4).
In this case, we have a situation of incomplete but symmetric information. This
means, on the one hand, that a and b can be costlessly observed (and thus that
contracts written as a function of a and b are perfectly enforceable in court)
6This is an extreme representation of the plausible assumption that the EPA has better
information with respect to this alternative project than with respect to the agent’s eﬀort
allocation.
7Alternatively, this ﬁne could just dissappear in the general budget of the government -
this possibility is the subject of ongoing research by the authors.
5and on the other hand that pi(a) and qj(b) are common knowledge. Under this
scenario, we obtain the standard result that the EPA chooses the contingent
payment schedule and the eﬀort levels that maximize the joint payoﬀs.
However, in reality, it seems reasonable to assume that the EPA can observe
the output vectors, but cannot observe the eﬀort levels (Section 5). Following
the suggestion we mentioned in the introduction, we shall now assume that the
EPA is only allowed to base its incentive schemes on observed environmental
performance. Thus, when the EPA has observed αi, the agent receives a (possi-
bly negative) payment xi. We then go on to prove the central result we already
mentioned in Section 1.
3 The agent’s problem
Let us now look into the agent’s objective function.
In order to abstract from any distortion that might arise from other sources
than the multi-tasking nature of the problem at hand, we suppose that the agent
is risk-neutral.
If the agent receives a monetary payoﬀ yij, contingent on the realization of
































(yij + βj) −
∂c(a,b)
∂b





In general, this objective function is not concave with respect to a and b.
Therefore, following Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [13], we assume from now on the gen-
eralized concavity of the distribution function of expected beneﬁts (CDFC) to
hold, this is:







are negative semi-deﬁnite for all i,j and for all a,b.
6The convexity of c(a,b) and generalized CDFC then imply concavity of the
agent’s objective function with respect to a and b, and thus:
Lemma 1 For a given contingent monetary payoﬀ schedule yij, the eﬀort levels
chosen by the agent are given by Conditions 1 and 2.
4 Eﬃcient solution
If eﬀorts levels were observable, then the EPA would provide a contingent pay-
ment schedule yi,j (
P
i,j pi(a)qj(b)yi,j is then expected ﬁnancial transfers to










i,j pi(a)qj(b)yij − c(a,b) ≥ U∗ (4)
where Condition 4 is the participation constraint: given the contingent wage
schedule yi,j and demanded eﬀort levels a and b, the agent will only participate
if its expected utility is higher than the reservation utility U∗ that it can get by
opting out.
Let γP
ES be the Lagrange multiplier associated with this participation con-
straint.
Let us also assume that Y and the absolute value of xmin allow for an interior
solution for yi,j.







ES pi(a)qj(b) = 0 (5)







dyi,j < 0 implies that γP
ES > 0: the participation constraint must
be binding, which is a completely standard result in the case with observable
eﬀort. As, moreover, the environmental beneﬁt is strictly concave in the sums
allocated to it, Equation 6 implies that yi,j must be a constant.
The optimal wage y∗ is then such that the participation constraint is binding:




7Because y∗ is a constant, substitution of Equation 7 in 3 gives:
X
i
pi(a)αi + EB(Y +
X
j
qj(b)βj − c(a,b) − U∗) (8)









αi − EB0 ∂c(a,b)
∂a
≤ 0 a ≥ 0
∂ES
∂a











} ≤ 0 b ≥ 0
∂ES
∂b
b = 0 (10)
The strict concavity of EB, the convexity of c(a,b) and generalized CDFC
then imply concavity of the eﬃcient objective function with respect to a and b.
Therefore, the ﬁrst-best eﬀort levels (aES,bES) are given by Conditions 9 and
10.
Of course, Conditions 9 and 10 simply state that, in an interior solution,
marginal beneﬁts should equal marginal costs. Just note that the marginal cost
of environmental protection is the product of two marginal costs: the marginal




A natural question to ask here is whether anything can be said on the relation
between the point that the agent would choose in the absence of regulation
(ao,bo) and the eﬃcient solution (aES,bES).
As there is no intrinsic motivation at all to undertake environmental eﬀort,
complementary slackness in Condition 1 implies that without regulation, a = 0.
Thus, we are certain that aES > ao.
However, nothing can be said on the relation between bES and bo: the agent’s
unregulated eﬀort on his core task can be both smaller or larger than the social
optimum.
5 The noncooperative game
We now impose that the EPA cannot provide any side payment that depends
on task B (neither on the exerted eﬀort nor on the output). However, when the
EPA has observed αi, the agent receives a (possibly negative) payment xi.
Let (aNG,bNG) be the optimal values of (a,b) under the noncooperative
game.
We can now immediately make the following observation:
Lemma 2 If an increase (a decrease) in eﬀort on task A leads to a higher
probability of observing αi, then an increase (a decrease) of the payment the
8agent receives when αi is observed, will lead the agent to implement a higher
eﬀort on task A, and to implement a lower eﬀort on task B.
Proof
Conditions 1 and 2 deﬁne (aNG,bNG) as an implicit function of the wage
schedule xi oﬀered by the EPA.
Suppose we have an interior solution for (aNG,bNG). As xi does not depend





























































































































































The concavity of EPo implies that ∂
2EPo





















> 0. Therefore, we obtain that ∂a
∂xi > 0 iﬀ
dpi(a)
da > 0.











































































da > 0. 2 QED 2
Suppose now that the payment schedule is such that xi = xmin for all i such
that
dpi(a)
da < 0 (thus, for i < i∗) and xj = Y otherwise. From Equation 13 (resp.
Equation 14), it is clear that any allowed change in the payment structure will
lead to a decrease in environmental eﬀort (resp. increase in eﬀort on the agent’s
core task). We thus obtain:
Lemma 3 The agent’s eﬀort on environmental protection will be maximal (and
its eﬀort on its core task will be minimal) with the following payment schedule:
xi = xmin for all i < i∗ and xi = Y otherwise.
From this analysis, it also follows that the higher the EPA’s budget and
the higher the ﬁnes it can impose, the higher the maximal environmental eﬀort
(and the lower the minimal eﬀort on the core task). However, we shall show
below that, despite these unambiguous eﬀects on eﬀort, an increase in these
parameters has an ambiguous eﬀect on total environmental quality.
5.1 The “corner” nature of the solution
Anticipating the agent’s choice of aNG and bNG, a rational EPA will set a con-
tingent wage schedule xi in order to maximize the expected diﬀerence between
performance on task A and the cost of wage payments, such that the agent’s
objective function is at a maximum, and such that the agent is willing to par-
ticipate.
A standard method for solving this kind of moral hazard asymmetric infor-
mation problems is the so-called ﬁrst-order approach, which consists in adding
the agent’s FOC as equality constraints to the EPA’s maximization problem.
It is, however, only valid under speciﬁc assumptions. Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [13]
discusses these assumptions in the speciﬁc case of a multi-signal problem. MLRP
and CDFC imply that the solution to the EPA’s problem is given by the solution





pi(a)(αi + EB(Y − xi)) (15)
subject to ∂EPo
∂a = 0, ∂EPo




i pi(a)xi −c(a,b) ≥ U∗.
In order to verify whether this solution does indeed exist, we will add the
following constraint. From Lemma 3, we know that the existence of a maximal
penalty and the EPA’s budget constraints imposes constraints on the possible
values of b that are implementable. Let b∗ be the smallest implementable value
of b. Thus, b∗ is the smallest value of b ≥ 0 such that there exists a wage
schedule for which ∂EPo
∂a = 0 and ∂EPo
∂b = 0.
Let γP
NG be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation con-
straint, while γa
NG is the Lagrange multiplier associated with ∂EPo
∂a = 0 and γb
NG
is the Lagrange multiplier associated with ∂EPo
∂b = 0. γb∗ is the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with the condition b ≥ b∗, requiring b to be implementable.
Finally, γi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the EPA’s budget con-
straint Y ≥ xi and θi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with xi ≥ xmin.




















pi(a)xi − c(a,b) − U∗}
+γb∗{b − b∗} +
X
i
γi{Y − xi} +
X
i
θi{xi − xmin} (16)












NG pi(a) − γi + θi = 0
If xmin < xi < Y , then we have an interior solution, γi = 0, θi = 0 and this












Lemma 4 If there exists a second-best solution where the agent exerts strictly
positive environmental eﬀort, then γa
NG > 0 and γP
NG > 0.
This result can be proofed using the procedure developed by Jewitt [5] - see
Appendix A for full details.
11Strict MLRP also implies that
dpi(a)
da
pi(a) is increasing in i. Hence, the LHS of




< 0 implies then:
Lemma 5 xi is increasing in i
This is a standard result (compare for instance, with Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [13]).
Suppose now that there exists an imax such that ximax−1 < Y ≤ ximax, where
ximax−1 and ximax are unconstrained solutions to Equation 17. This implies
that for all i ≥ imax, the EPA’s budget constraint is binding: the transfer is
then independent of i. Similarly, there possibly is a cut-oﬀ level imin such that
xi = xmin for all i ≤ imin.
Let us now move to the conditions for the eﬀort levels. If a > 0 and b > 0,




































Finally, the FOC with respect to γb∗ are:
b ≥ b∗ γb∗ ≥ 0 γb∗{b − b∗} = 0 (20)
Suppose now that we have an interior solution: a > 0 and b > b∗.
Complementary slackness in the FOC with respect to γb∗ implies that γb∗ =
0, while complementary slackness in the agent’s FOC implies that ∂EPo
∂b = 0.





∂a∂b < 0. The concavity
of the agent’s objective function implies that ∂
2EPo
∂b2 < 0. However, Sinclair-
Desgagn´ e [13] has shown that if the ﬁrst-order approach can be used at all,
then γa
NG and γb
NG must have the same sign.




∂b < 0 and the
EPA’s ﬁrst-order conditions cannot be satisﬁed.
Therefore, an equilibrium is only possible for a = 0 or b = b∗.
Complementary slackness in the agent’s FOC (Condition 1) implies that
∂EPo
∂a < 0 induces a = 0. This will certainly be the case if xi is a constant, say
X. The agent’s objective function reduces then to:
P
j qj(b)βj + X − c(a,b).
Thus, the agent will act as if there is no regulation at all, and will undertake
eﬀort levels (0,bo).
Note now that the agent will only participate in an unregulated economic
activity if its expected net surplus of participation
P
j qj(bo)βj − c(0,bo) −
U∗ is nonnegative. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that −xmin ≤
12P
j qj(bo)βj − c(0,bo) − U∗. Indeed, the alternative (an upper limit to the
penalties that is higher than the maximal possible surplus) would not really
make sense.
Therefore, the optimal side payment is the highest possible ﬁne xmin. In
this case, the payment has no incentive eﬀect whatsoever.
The EPA’s expected payoﬀ is then:
X
i
pi(0)αi + EB(Y − xmin) (21)
The other possible optimum is where b = b∗ and where a takes its maximal
possible value a∗. The penalty structure then takes the form proposed in Lemma
3. The EPA’s expected payoﬀ is then:
X
i




Proposition 1 If the EPA can provide the agent with a payment schedule that
only depends on performance on task A, if the environmental beneﬁt of the
alternative project is strictly concave in the sums allocated to it, and if tasks A
and B are substitutes in eﬀort, then there are two possible optima:
• The EPA imposes a ﬂat ﬁne that exhausts the agent’s participation con-
straint and the agent undertakes the eﬀort levels that correspond to the
“no-regulation” case.
• The EPA provides the payment schedule described in Lemma 3, and the
agent provides the highest implementable environmental eﬀort and the low-
est possible implementable eﬀort on its core task. This smallest imple-
mentable eﬀort level b is possibly bounded away from zero.
From (21) and (22), we see that the solution corresponding to the unregu-








This condition states that the solution corresponding to the unregulated
eﬀort levels will be preferred if and only if the environmental gains of higher
expected budget for the EPA exceed the direct environmental gain of regulating
the agent’s environmental eﬀort.
From this comparison, we can also understand the ambiguity of the role
played by the EPA’s budget (or the maximal allowed ﬁne).
From (21), we see that in the unregulated case, the eﬀect of an increase in
the EPA’s budget (or in the maximal allowed ﬁne) is clear: it unambiguously
13leads to higher environmental quality. However, from (22), we see that with
the penalty structure from Lemma 3, the eﬀects are ambiguous. An increase
in the EPA’s budget increases the sum that are available, both for providing
incentives to the agent, and for the alternative environmental project. However,
if environmental eﬀort increases, then the probability of observing high values
of environmental performance increases, and thus also the probability that the
EPA will not levy the ﬁne, but will transfer its entire budget to the agent instead.
This ambiguity cannot be solved in general.
5.2 Suﬃcient conditions for the elimination of the agent’s
core activity
Although the eﬀect of a higher budget (or higher maximal ﬁnes) on total en-
vironmental performance is ambiguous, its eﬀect on the agent’s eﬀort levels is
very clear.
Indeed, remember that in the payment schedule proposed in Lemma 3: xi =
xmin for all i such that
dpi(a)
da < 0 and xi = Y otherwise.















It is clear that without a lower limit to the ﬁnes that can be imposed, and
an upper limit to the EPA’s budget, the LHS of this Equation can be made to
grow into inﬁnity. However, the RHS must then also grow into inﬁnity, for any
value of b. From the properties of the cost function,
∂c(a,b)
∂a → ∞ for any value
of b, requires a → ∞ as well.
Suppose now that lima→∞
∂c(a,0)
∂b = ∞ as well. This condition means that
for very high values of environmental eﬀort, the marginal cost of undertaking






db βj for all b.









Thus, we have shown that there exist conditions for which the EPA will
induce zero eﬀort level on task B, thus for which b∗ = 0.
Proposition 2 If the EPA’s budget (or the maximal allowed penalties) can
grow without limits and if lima→∞
∂c(a,0)
∂b = ∞, then, in the regulated optimum,
the EPA will induce the agent to require zero eﬀort on task B and a larger than
eﬃcient eﬀort on task A.
14The result we obtain here implies a complete collapse of any economic ac-
tivity that does not contribute to environmental performance - it is particularly
striking because the payments only depend on αi!
Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom [4] provide some intuition for this result: “when
inputs are substitutes, incentives for any given activity ti can be provided either
by rewarding that activity or by reducing its opportunity cost (by reducing the
incentives for the other activities)”. If there are upper limits, but no lower
limits to the ﬁnancial transfer, then the EPA is unlimited in the penalties it can
impose for very low observed environmental performance. On the other hand,
if there are lower limits, but no upper limits, then the EPA is unlimited in the
rewards it can give for high observed environmental performance. As the eﬀort
levels are substitutes in the cost function, this means that in both cases, the
EPA can increase the expected cost of positive eﬀort on the core task without
limits.
This result is of course not credible: how could the EPA bribe all the other
actors in society not to undertake their core tasks? However, it shows the
importance of imposing the right constraints on government agencies.
6 Conclusion
We have considered the regulation of a (private or public) agent by an EPA.
This EPA is constrained to basing its incentive schemes (both rewards and
punishments) on environmental performance, and can also allocate funds to an
alternative project with environmental beneﬁts.
The private agent can allocate its eﬀorts either to environmental protection
or to its core tasks. If these two tasks are substitutes in eﬀort, then there are
two possible optima:
• The EPA imposes a ﬂat ﬁne that exhausts the agent’s participation con-
straint and the agent undertakes the eﬀort levels that correspond to the
“no-regulation” case. This ﬂat ﬁne is then used completely to ﬁnance the
alternative project.
• The EPA provides the harshest possible punishment for any observed en-
vironmental performance whose likelihood of observation is decreasing in
environmental eﬀort and the highest possible reward for any observed en-
vironmental performance whose likelihood of observation is increasing in
environmental eﬀort. The agent provides the highest implementable envi-
ronmental eﬀort and the lowest possible implementable eﬀort on its core
task. In this case, increases in the available budget and in the maximally
allowed penalty have an ambiguous eﬀect on total environmental quality,
but can lead to a situation where the eﬀort on the agent’s core task is
reduced to zero.
The ﬁrst optimum might appear at ﬁrst sight to be just a theoretical curios-
ity. The remarkable point, however, is that it is actually quite close to the actual
15experience with the Flemish water levies we have described in the introduction:
Van Humbeeck [16] has argued extensively that, in practice, the Flemish water
levies have had no discernible incentive eﬀect and were used as pure ﬁnancing
levies. Similarly, the vast majority of Flemish municipal environmental taxes
are just lump sum taxes that contribute to the ﬁnancing of garbage collection
and treatment [1].
Of course, the strongest results depend crucially on the assumptions we have
made with respect to the agent’s cost of eﬀort. For instance, if the agent has
some intrinsic motivation with respect to the environment or if both tasks are
complements rather than substitutes in eﬀort, then Proposition 1 does not hold.
The weakest point of this analysis is probably that the maximal ﬁnes and
the EPA’s budget have not been fully endogenized. A fruitful point for further
research could be to determine these variables as the result of a political process.
Also, a typical EPA must supervise several agents. In a classic paper, Holm-
str¨ om [3] has shown that any agent’s wage schedule must depend on any ob-
served behavior of the other agents that is informative of his performance. This
constitutes another obvious area for further research.
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A Proof of Lemma 4
Let aR be the solution to the EPA’s optimisation problem, if such a solution
exists.




























where EaR(.) is the expectations operator conditionnal on aR. Equation 26
implies immediately that γP
NG > 0: the participation constraint is binding.
































If aR > 0, the complementary slackness condition γa
NG
∂EPo




















On the one hand, our basic assumption
dEB(Y −xi(a
R)




dxi } ≤ 0 - and this inequality holds strictly unless xi(aR)




Thus, if aR > 0, then γa
NG > 0. 8
8Note that this result also follows directly from Sinclair-Desgagn´ e [13] - we prefer to give
an explicit proof here, as it clearly shows where this result comes from.
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